[Chairman: Mr. Evans]

[10:05 a.m.]

MR. CHAIRMAN: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I'd like to call the meeting to order. I trust that all of you have received the notice of the meeting, which indicates the agenda for today's meeting.

We will begin with Bill Pr. 1, Canadian Union College Amendment Act, 1989. The petitioner is represented, I believe, by Gerry Chipeur. Gerry, if I could give you just a little bit of information about these committee meetings. You will be sworn in, and you'll have an opportunity to make some opening comments and then make your presentation. Following your presentation, rather than during your presentation to committee members, we would appreciate comments from the committee members – questions, whatever. We will then allow you to make a summation. It is the policy of this committee to review the matters that are before the committee and make decisions at some later date rather than the date the presentation is made. I hope you can appreciate the rationale for that decision. So we would appreciate it if you would please be sworn in and then make your opening comments.

Thank you.

MR. M. CLEGG: Mr. Chairman, I would just like to make a couple of comments before we proceed.

Firstly, although Mr. Chipeur is a solicitor for the petitioners and not a petitioner himself, because he is here by himself we will be relying on material statements of fact from him regarding the petitioners' organization. This, for the benefit of the committee, is the reason why we are treating him both as counsel and witness this morning. I hadn't had a chance to explain that to him, but I'm sure he will appreciate the fact that he is not in a position to ask a representative of the petitioner to give testimony. So if there are any factual questions, it is a matter of invariable routine that our witnesses are put on oath prior to the commencement of the giving of evidence.

Secondly, I present a report on each private Bill to the committee, and this may be done at any stage. I will be making this report in writing to members of the committee. The report is essentially the same as the statement I made to the committee at our last meeting, when I was outlining the content of the Bills, that the purpose of this Bill is to amend one of the sections in the Act which relates to the receipt of premiums and the granting of annuities and to provide that that scheme is not treated as life insurance under the Insurance Act.

The third thing I'd like to mention before we start is that at a very late stage Mr. Chipeur drew to our attention a couple of very minor typographical errors in the Bill, a result of the very heavy pressure of Bill printing we have been through. Because these are not material matters to the content of the Bill, I have decided that these would come within my editorial authority as Parliamentary Counsel to change. So we did not delay the printing of the Bill. They are matters which I will change on the official copy, but I would draw this to the attention of the members: in the third line of the Bill, in the first preamble, it refers to "chapter 32 of the Statutes of Alberta, 1947," which should read "chapter 82." And on the explanatory notes, the first line reads "This Bill will amend chapter e35" and it should read "chapter 35." In the third line it says "Canadian Union College may receive and hold for its benefit sum of money." It should read "sums of money." I hope the committee will agree these are minor matters. We didn't wish to delay the printing of the Bill, and as I say, I will correct the official copy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will swear the witness in.

[Mr. Chipeur was sworn in]

MR. CHAIRMAN: Please proceed, Mr. Chipeur.

MR. CHIPEUR: I can advise the committee that in addition to being the solicitor for Canadian Union College, I happen to be on the board of trustees of the college and in such a position would be able to answer any questions you may have with regard to the college itself.

The amendment we are seeking this morning is an amendment to allow the college to continue to exercise powers it was given in 1979 through an amendment to the Act. If you'll turn to the introduction in the background brief under tab 4, you will see a short history of the college, a description of the college at the present time. It currently has an affiliation agreement with the University of Alberta and is involved in various programs with other colleges and at the present time has an application before the Alberta Private Colleges Accreditation Board.

The section in issue is section 9.1. I'd originally indicated 1979. It was in 1972 that the amendment was added. This allowed the college, in consideration for donations to the college of amounts of money, to pay an annuity to an individual. This allowed the college to benefit the individual under the Income Tax Act in that the principal that was repaid as annuity payments was not subject to tax under Interpretation Bulletin 111R. This was a benefit to the individual in that they would be able to benefit their alma mater and at the same time provide some security for their future in that they would be guaranteed an annuity for the rest of their life. In 1981, because of a court decision, the life insurance Act was amended to read that all annuities would be deemed to be life insurance under that Act. This created problems for my client in that the superintendent of insurance interpreted the life insurance Act to apply to the types of annuities that were referred to in section 9.1 of the Canadian Union College Act. In discussions with him we came upon the wording you presently have before you as the suggested amendment.

As I indicate in the submissions, last year the language was incorporated into The Alberta Conference of the Seventh-day Adventist Church Act. The language you have before you, then, is language that will exempt the annuities that have been or will be granted by Canadian Union College from the onerous provisions of the life insurance Act with regard to — basically, the college would have to be a life insurance company itself in order to continue to take advantage of section 9.1. The operative portion for our purposes is the last two lines of section 9.1, which is under tab 3, and that is, the "annuity shall be deemed not to be life insurance under section 1 (m.1) or 240.1 of the Insurance Act."

I would be happy to answer any questions you may have with respect to our suggested amendment.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chipeur. Any questions from the committee? Mr. Brassard.

MR. BRASSARD: Yes, Mr. Chairman. Pardon my ignorance, but how do other universities or colleges or organizations handle this? I wonder if Mr. Clegg could give me a general statement of how other colleges handle such donations and annuities. Is that a fair question?

MR. M. CLEGG: Mr. Chairman, I would never say that any questions were unfair, but I do not know the answer, I'm afraid. All I can confirm, as Mr. Chipeur has said, is that last year the Seventh Day Adventist Church asked for a similar amendment with respect to their private Act of incorporation. I'm not aware of whether many other colleges have annuity programs, and Mr. Chipeur may know that. I'm not aware what their position is on this amendment.

MR. BRASSARD: Well, I guess very obviously my concern is that we're being asked to waive an income tax structure or a tax structure here that was obviously put in place in 1981 for a reason. I guess I would like to further develop the rationale of why we should consider waiving that.

MR. CHIPEUR: I can give you some background on the case that brought about this amendment. It was a case involving some trust companies, life insurance companies. The issue was whether an annuity was covered by the life insurance Act; in other words, people in a commercial business. We're not dealing with commercial annuities here; we're talking about charitable donations. What happened was that some businesses in the business of annuities had gone to court arguing that they were not subject to the life insurance Act, and in fact the court said: "Yes, you are right. You are not, as an annuity company, subject to the life insurance Act." So an amendment was made to the life insurance.

Now, our position as a private college was that since 1972 we had the right, in consideration for a donation, to provide some security for the future for individuals who had made a large donation and that the amendment did not apply to us. The superintendent of insurance took a different position, but he was of the opinion that the amendment that was made in '81 was not intended to apply to donations such as were considered under our private Act, and therefore he had no problem with an amendment to exempt these types of donations and the concomitant annuity from the rigorous provisions of the life insurance Act, which would of course require large cash assets as are required by the life insurance Act for a life insurance company. So the action that actually caused the amendment had nothing to do with these types of annuity programs.

In response to your first question, I do not believe it is common in Alberta at the present time to have these types of annuity programs. However, it is common across Canada, particularly in Ontario, where the Anglican church has a program, because I have been in contact with them and have their annuity forms. So it is something that is common because of IT-111R. It is something that does allow the individual to make a donation and benefit from a tax-free annuity. The tax-free portion, of course, is a return of principal and therefore should not be subject to tax. So it's not a loophole in the tax system, but it's a policy or procedure Revenue Canada has put in place to recognize a factual situation.

MR. BRASSARD: Thank you very much.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Mr. Woloshyn.

MR. WOLOSHYN: Yes. When the original donation is made, the donor would receive a tax benefit at that time?

MR. CHIPEUR: They will receive a tax benefit equal to the difference between the value of the annuity to them and the donation. For example, based on their life expectancy, there is going to be a certain expected return of principal, and they would receive a charitable donation receipt for any excess that is donated. The amount that would be expected to be received back in principal would not be credited with a charitable donation receipt because they will be expected to receive it back over time, based on the annuity tables in IT-111R, which say if you are 62, you are expected to live another 20 years, et cetera.

MR. CHAIRMAN: It's deemed to be a repayment of principal rather than a repayment of interest.

MR. CHIPEUR: Exactly.

MRS. HEWES: Mr. Chairman and Mr. Chipeur, you indicated discussions with the superintendent of insurance in Alberta, and I thought I got the inference that he believes the changes were not made to be applicable to circumstances such as yours. Do we have any correspondence to that effect?

MR. CHIPEUR: Yes, we do, and I can provide that.

MRS. HEWES: From the superintendent?

MR. CHIPEUR: Yes, I believe it would be in the file relating to The Alberta Conference of the Seventh-day Adventist Church Act. Again, I think the intent was not to cover us, but his opinion is that in effect the wording is broad enough to include us. So he recommends that we do this rather than take the risk of doing it without the amendment and then being subject to a legal battle over whether or not the life insurance act in fact does override the powers given to us in our private Act.

MRS. HEWES: And we have correspondence to that effect, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Chipeur.

MR. CHIPEUR: Yes.

MRS. HEWES: Thank you.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Mrs. Black.

MRS. BLACK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess my concern is similar to Mr. Brassard's concern on the tax implications on this interpretation bulletin. I don't know whether it's a good idea to be making judgment on interpretation bulletins in this form, but the amendment says "Canadian Union College may receive and hold for its benefit sums of money in consideration of the payment, during the life of the donor. You're almost assuming a trust position, from the way I read that amendment, yet you're functioning as a college. I'm concerned, over the long term, about the fact that you're setting yourself up to administer an annuity plan within a college system. I would assume that the interest earned from the annuity investment would be reinvested within the plan or within the college fund, because it says "for its benefit sums."

Now, I'm looking down the road, the future burdens and encumbrances that may be placed on the institution as to what kinds of guidelines or other amendments you would have to accommodate a quasi trust scenario within the college itself. I think you're entering into an area that may be... In a church environment there is that trust through the vestries, et cetera, that exists, and in a college there doesn't appear to be that same infrastructure that can deal with these things. I think a concern I have is that there would have to be some very rigid definitions and guidelines incorporated again within your Act or your bylaws to administer that.

I'm also not too sure that I agree with the fact that because this interpretation bulletin does deal with the annuities and life insurance programs, circumventing that interpretation bulletin is the correct way to deal with the tax advantage for individuals.

So I have a couple of questions. One, I'm not too sure that that interpretation bulletin should be circumvented, and two, I'm concerned about the vehicle that would be in place to administer a quasi trust fund for future.

MR. CHIPEUR: I can answer those questions and give you the comments that would apply. In fact, we are not attempting to circumvent, but we are attempting to actually come underneath it. In other words, we would like it to apply just as it applies in every other province that does not have this type of provision. Other provinces, such as Ontario, allow this type of program. Alberta did, as the 1972 amendment allowed us, until 1981, when because of the broad language, it was interpreted not to allow it. So we're not trying to circumvent 111R; in fact, we're trying to come directly under it. We want to have the tax laws apply to us. We're just asking for equality for Alberta charitable organizations with other charitable organizations in other provinces.

MRS. BLACK: Do you have a copy of that interpretation bulletin that could be distributed?

MR. CHIPEUR: Yes, I do.

That bulletin provides that when a donor makes a donation of a principal amount of money and that principal amount is more than is necessary to cover the expected annuity payments over the term that person is expected to live, then the excess is treated as a charitable donation, and the annuity payments are tax free. Now, that is just an interpretation, of course, of the Income Tax Act itself, so we're saying we want to be able to fall under that interpretation of the Income Tax Act just as we would if we were in Ontario, for example.

The concerns about whether or not there will be assets to cover this in the future are important concerns, and we have addressed them in three ways. The first is that in conjunction with the superintendent of insurance, we have drafted this so there will be a term certain. So if the person were to live longer than the term certain, it would cease to exist. You'll notice in the language that it says: terminating on the earlier of a specified date or the death of the donor, whichever comes first. This will allow us to ensure that the principal will not be used up and then somehow will go on to a point where we're depleting the assets of the college to cover this annuity, which is a concern. So that was covered in discussions with the superintendent of insurance.

Secondly, the college does have, as I have indicated, over \$20 million in assets. It does not have any encumbrances other than the normal payables. So there is a substantial institution at College Heights, and as I indicated, there are cash and noncash assets that would be available, just as there would be for a church. In fact, Canadian Union College is part of the Seventh Day Adventist Church system and would be subject, and is in fact subject, to the same policies respecting trust funds that would apply to the church, and that is that the funds must be set aside. In fact, these donations, when made under these conditions, are set aside. Usually it's the interest that is used to actually repay the principal, and then the principal amount stays there in trust until the term is over. The principal amount at that time is accepted into the general funds of the college for whatever purpose is deemed best at that time.

So there are internal controls as well as external controls in the amendment as it is right now. We have no problem with any further controls you would wish to put in place, although it is our position that those three controls — the external, internal, and the actual assets right now, along with the connection with the Seventh Day Adventist Church with its assets across Canada — would certainly give the individual the benefit of some security.

MRS. BLACK: Sir, are you classified as a charitable organization under section 149.1(1)(b)?

MR. CHIPEUR: We are a charitable organization under the Income Tax Act, and we're able to ...

MRS. BLACK: Under 149 classification?

MR. CHIPEUR: I don't have that. A charitable organization is a defined term under the Income Tax Act, so we would be a charitable organization. I don't have the Income Tax Act in front of me, so I don't know if it's 149.1(1)(b) that would apply. But there is only one charitable organization designation, and we are under that.

MRS. BLACK: As well, a charitable organization as defined in paragraph 149.1 may enter into such arrangements without jeopardizing its registered status. A charitable foundation as defined in paragraph 149.1 may not do so.

MR. CHIPEUR Right, and we are not a charitable foundation.

MRS. BLACK: You are a charitable organization?

MR. CHIPEUR: Yes.

MRS. BLACK: As defined under your bylaws?

MR. CHIPEUR: Well, as registered with Revenue Canada. We have to go through an application process. They assess whether or not we meet the requirements of the Act, and then they issue a tax donation number that we would issue receipts under.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Mrs. Black, if I just could interject for a moment. I believe the decision as to whether the college qualifies for the tax exemption or not is ultimately a decision of the federal government through the Income Tax Act. The Income Tax Act is the enabling legislation that allows for the creation of annuities. The Act as we see it, the Canadian Union College Amendment Act, 1989, enables this particular college to take advantage, if you will, of that legislation. There is a problem with conflicting legislation in the province of Alberta, and that's the reason we have Mr. Chipeur in front of us today. MRS. BLACK: Good.

MRS. B. LAING: I just wonder if you could very simply explain how an individual would go through the process of the annuity and what happens. You know, I'm not clear on the procedure here.

MR. CHIPEUR: The individual would come to the college and say, "I would like to make a donation to the college, but I would like to have an annuity paid to me during the rest of my life or for a certain term so I have some security." The college would then sit down with the individual and say: "How much do you want to donate, and how much do you want to receive as an annuity? What are your needs?" The individual would indicate the amount and would indicate the amount of the annuity they require. The college would then assess the length of time that would be required to cover the principal repayment and would indicate to the individual, "If you donate X amount of dollars, for example \$100,000, with a \$500 annuity per month, then you will use up your principal in so many years, or you fall under IT-111R and you will not, under your expected life expectancy, use up that annuity, so there is a portion you will receive a charitable donation receipt for." In that case, the individual would make the donation, the money is absolutely transferred to the college, the college holds those funds, and then each month an annuity is paid to that individual. Then for that excess amount a charitable donation receipt is immediately given to the individual.

If the individual were to die within a few months, then that would be it. The donation is made; the individual's annuity ceases. If they continue to live, the annuity will continue to be paid until they die or the term certain that is specified in the amendment, and at that point the annuity would cease. The individual, of course, would not be paying any tax on this annuity if the annuity falls under IT-111R. If the annuity doesn't -- but of course that's not our concern--- then the Income Tax Act would apply, and a certain portion would be considered principal and a certain portion considered interest and taxed accordingly.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Mrs. Hewes, do you have another question?

MRS. HEWES: Yes, thanks, Mr. Chairman. Just curiosity. This happened some years ago. Why didn't you do it before? Has something occurred recently, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Chipeur, that made this necessary?

MR. CHIPEUR: In 1981 the amendment to the life insurance Act went by unnoticed. Then recently someone said, "I want to take advantage of that section of your Act, and I want to make that donation." Also, we had the same issue with the Alberta conference of the Seventh Day Adventist church. Someone came forward to that entity during my association with them, so I followed up with the superintendent of insurance and said: "Here is my interpretation. I think our private Act gives us the power to do this." And he said, "I don't think it does, because I think the life insurance Act overrides the power given to you in your private Act." So we have conflicting decisions, and of course I did not want to create a legal issue. I said, "Well, what would satisfy you to allow the private Act to continue to give us the power which obviously was intended to be given to the college in '72?" He said, in the context of The Alberta Conference of the Seventh-day Adventist Church Act, this language, which tracks very closely the '72 amendment except for the last portion and the period terminating on a specified date or the date of death of the donor, would achieve that goal of satisfying him that our Act then would give us that power notwithstanding the broad language that was contained in the life insurance Act.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Mrs. Gagnon.

MRS. GAGNON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have two questions. The first one is: are you aware if there are other incorporated, affiliated, accredited colleges seeking the same powers?

MR. CHIPEUR: I am not aware of that. No, I don't know of any.

MRS. GAGNON: It's something that might come up only when the situation presents itself, with regards to that request.

MR. CHIPEUR: That's right. Exactly.

MRS. GAGNON: My second question is a little off the topic, but you did say you were prepared to answer broader questions. Has the Canadian Union College application to become a degree-granting institution been accepted, are you aware?

MR. CHIPEUR: The conditions for its acceptance have been accepted. In other words, the Private Colleges Accreditation Board has said: we will accredit you upon the fulfillment of certain conditions. Basically it is: fill these faculty appointments. The college has said to it: we have contracts or we have individuals identified, but they can't come at the present time; it won't be until September or January of the next year. So until the full complement of faculty is in place, the accreditation will not go through, but accreditation per se has been approved based on certain conditions being met. Those have not in fact been met but are in the process of being met.

MRS. GAGNON: Actually, I'm talking about your attempt to become a freestanding degree-granting institution.

MR. CHIPEUR: Yes. In fact, as I indicated, the Private Colleges Accreditation Board has approved the college for that status on the achievement of certain conditions. Those conditions mainly relate to having, for example, an economics professor or an English professor in place in a certain discipline. Those are in the process, but until they're actually in place, the accreditation won't be put through the minister's office.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Committee members, any additional questions? Well, thank you for your presentation, Mr. Chipeur. Would you like to make any kind of summary?

MR. CHIPEUR: I believe that the position of the college and a thorough explanation of the reason for our application is contained in the background material. I would just encourage you to read that if you have any further questions, because I believe you will find the answers in that document.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much for your presentation. The committee will report to you in due course. Thank you.

The next Bill that will be considered is Bill Pr. 8, Omprakash

Panjwani Adoption Act. Mr. Panjwani, I trust that you heard the earlier explanation to the first applicant indicating that it's not the practice of this committee to make a decision on the applications today. However, we will be getting back to you in due course. Would you like to make any initial comments before the swearing in?

MR. J. PANJWANI: Not quite.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Very good.

[Mr. J. Panjwani and Mr. O. Panjwani were sworn in]

MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, gentlemen. Could you please proceed with your presentation.

MR. J. PANJWANI: Yes. I have been looking after him since he was a minor. He went to school under my care, then he finished Mount Royal College in Calgary, and now he's working. I have always in practice considered him as my son. I have one daughter and I have no other son, so I want to adopt him.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, sir. Questions from the committee?

MR. DOYLE: The other party involved is in agreement with this adoption?

MR. J. PANJWANI: Yes, sir.

MR. DOYLE: You'd like to see this proceed so that you'd be the adopted son of the gentlemen beside you?

MR. O. PANJWANI: I agree with the adoption.

MRS. B. LAING: I just wondered: is there a blood relationship between you and your . . .

MR. O. PANJWANI: He's my father's brother.

MRS. B. LAING: So you're uncle and nephew?

MR. J. PANJWANI: Yes, he's my brother's son.

MRS. B. LAING: Your family is still in your homeland?

MR. O. PANJWANI: Yes, ma'am. They are in Bombay, India.

MRS. B. LAING: They have agreed to this adoption?

MR. O. PANJWANI: Yes, ma'am. They have consented to the adoption.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Perhaps, Mr. Clegg, you'd like to give some more explanation on this.

MR. M. CLEGG: Mr. Chairman, we have on file copies of two documents. One is an affidavit which was filed in connection with the original guardianship of Omprakash Panjwani in 1981, and that is an affidavit of Mr. and Mrs. Panjwani of Maharashtra state in India, which states that they consented to Mr. Jamnu Panjwani, who is our petitioner today, becoming the sole guardian of the son. That was filed in connection with the guardianship order that was granted in the courts of Alberta in 1981. In addition, we have the original of a letter signed by Omprakash's father and dated January 12, 1989. This is not a formal court document, but it is in his handwriting and has been submitted to me by the petitioner. It's dated January 12, 1989, in Bombay, India.

To whom it may concern:

I hereby give consent to my brother Jamnu Panjwani to adopt my son Om Panjwani. My wife Meena Panjwani has also consented to the adoption.

It is signed by Gangaram Panjwani, and the signature on that document is the same as the signature which appears on the affidavit that was presented to the court in 1981.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Clegg.

MR. WOLOSHYN: Mr. Chairman, to Mr. Omprakash Panjwani. How old are you?

MR. O. PANJWANI: Right now I'm 23, sir.

MR. WOLOSHYN: Further question. What would be the advantage to you of being legally adopted? After having lived for eight years and built up very strong emotional bonds to your uncle, what would be the advantage of a legal adoption at a time when you are of adult age?

MR. O. PANJWANI: Well, sir, it only makes it so much easier on both of us. He's my father in practice. I don't want to go around telling people that he's my father in practice. I want him legally to be my father. So it's just a matter of convenience in the family.

MR. WOLOSHYN: Could I ask you another question, sir? Have you attained Canadian citizenship?

MR. O. PANJWANI: Not yet, sir.

MR. WOLOSHYN: Would this adoption then be of assistance for obtaining such citizenship?

MR. O. PANJWANI: It might be a by-product of it, but it's just a matter of family we are talking about.

MR. WOLOSHYN: Thank you.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I understand that in terms of a citizenship application, the status of an individual in Canada, whether married, single, adopted, or whatever, is not to be taken into consideration. That's in the regulations. Just for clarification, Mr. Woloshyn.

MR. BRASSARD: But just for clarification, it does make it easier if he is a member of the family.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Perhaps Mr. Clegg might wish to make a comment on that.

MR. M. CLEGG: Mr. Chairman, the predecessor committee acquired significant information on this topic when they were considering a previous application last year. The circumstances were somewhat different because at the time the putative adoptees were not landed immigrants, but in addition they were not even resident in Canada; they were not present in Canada. At that time the committee invited the immigration authorities to come to the committee as witnesses and brief the committee on the effect of an adoption to an immigration application. Prior to this committee considering this application at a subsequent date, I will present to the members of the committee the full transcript of that meeting so they may have the official analysis of the relationship between an adoption of an adult and immigration status.

There are two factors. Officially the regulations note that the adoption of a minor is not considered in any way in an immigration application if the adoption is above the age of 13. So from the first part of the official regulation application this would not have any influence on the immigration. However, they do consider in a subjective sense the factor of family reunification. Therefore, there is the possibility of the matter having some bearing on the immigration application. But rather than summarize the matter for the committee, I will, as I said, present copies of the transcript to the committee before the committee considers this matter so they will know what the immigration authorities' position is and how it might affect or how it might impact or not impact an immigration application.

MR. BRASSARD: Fine. Then may I proceed, Mr. Chairman? Could I clarify if indeed, then, Omprakash is a landed immigrant? Are you a landed immigrant?

MR. O. PANJWANI: No, sir, I'm not a landed immigrant.

MR. BRASSARD: What status, then, do you enjoy?

MR. O. PANJWANI: I have a work visa right now.

MR. BRASSARD: For the last eight years then?

MR. O. PANJWANI: No, I was on a student visa for the last nine years. This is my ninth year.

MR. BRASSARD: Fine. I guess the concern I have -- and perhaps you could address this, because I take it very seriously when we leave our natural parental grouping, especially when it's one of convenience and particularly when it's one by virtue of just a handwritten letter that hasn't been, as I understand it, verified by any court and has no indication on behalf of the mother other than the father stating an agreement on behalf of the mother, which gives me some concern. I would feel far more comfortable had both parents written a separate letter and both letters been verified by some official of a court or somewhere, because I take as a very serious matter a change of parents, particularly when the prime reason is for convenience. So I wonder if you could address those concerns that I have?

MR. J. PANJWANI: If I may. As a matter of fact, Mr. Clegg, that letter from my brother has the signature of his mother also. She has given the consent, and she has signed. She doesn't know any English, so it is signed in our own language, Hindi. It's with Mr. Clegg, the paper.

MR. BRASSARD: Neither of those signatures, then, am I led to

understand, have been verified by anyone?

MR. J. PANJWANI: I consulted Mr. Clegg, and he said that a simple letter will be good enough, because previously from them, when he was going to school, I had need for this. Previously they had sent me the regular court affidavit and their signatures, which are submitted with Mr. Clegg. So he is able to compare the signatures then. He guided me. He said: you don't need another formal one because I already have one. So I wrote my brother and he sent me this letter.

MR. BRASSARD: I'm not challenging the legality; I'm only expressing a concern of my own, that's all.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Mr. Clegg, would you like to comment on the letter or the application in general?

MR. M. CLEGG: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I don't think I actually said that I didn't need it to be a sworn statement. I said that we did need a consent. It does happen to be a simple letter. I see from Mr. Panjwani's explanation that the writing on here, which appears to be identical to the writing on the original affidavit, does indeed bear the apparent signature of the mother. It is certainly true that this document itself has not been notarized, whereas the previous document which consented to custody was notarized.

The other point is that this Bill does not affect the maternal relationship because it only creates a filial relationship between Omprakash Panjwani and Jamnu Panjwani. So it is the father's relationship which is being replaced under Canadian law by this adoption.

The further point is that in fact we have no knowledge as to whether this adoption will be recognized under Indian law, and it may be quite possible under Indian law that in India Omprakash might still be regarded as the son of his natural father even if we pass this Bill. Certainly he would, of course, still be the legal son of his natural mother. For the purpose of this application, it seemed not to be something which we could deal with, to determine the effect of this adoption in India, although if he is deemed to be domiciled here, an adoption in the country in which he was domiciled might indeed be recognized in India. But that's a question of law which I cannot give a direct opinion on.

MR. CHAIRMAN: It's really a question for interpretation by the Indian authorities. It's a jurisdictional question.

MR. M. CLEGG: Yes, indeed, Mr. Chairman.

MR. DOYLE: Mr. Chairman, I wasn't completely understanding the counsel. Did he say that there was authorization of the mother to grant the leave of this son to be adopted?

MR. M. CLEGG: Mr. Chairman, what I have here is a document which purports to be signed by both the father and the mother, consenting to the adoption. When I read it to the committee earlier, I had not understood the writing properly, but I agree with what Mr. Panjwani says, that it is indeed signed by both parties. All I can say is that it is not sworn before a notary the same way as the earlier 1981 document was. But I can say that purely by a visual comparison the signatures do seem to be the same. We don't have it sworn, but the document purports to be a consent by both parties.

MR. DOYLE: And furthermore, it's my understanding that we will get copies of all the background?

MR. M. CLEGG: Yes, indeed, Mr. Chairman. I will distribute copies of these documents to the committee before they consider the Bill in camera at a later date.

MR. SEVERTSON: I was just going to ask a question, a clarification maybe. Is it normal that we can pass a Bill for adoption for a person that isn't a citizen of the country?

MR. M. CLEGG: Mr. Chairman, as far as the history is concerned, there's only been one previous application for adoption before this committee that has dealt with a person who is not a citizen. That was an application which I referred to before which related to an adoption of nephews and nieces who were still in South America. That Bill was declined. The difference between that case and this case was that there had been no period of living together as a family, and the applicants were not yet in Canada as residents on any basis at all. The only similarity between those two cases, the previous one having been refused, is that Omprakash is not yet a landed immigrant. On that basis the two are the same. The difference is that Omprakash has been here for eight years and has lived with his uncle for eight years, whereas in the previous case there had been no familial connection at all since the uncle and aunt left South America and the nephews and nieces had never lived with them as if they were children of the family. So there isn't a direct precedent. The previous precedent has some similarities and some differences. I can review that case in more detail with the committee and present the facts to the committee for them in summary.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Mrs. Gagnon.

MRS. GAGNON: Yes. I guess I have two questions again. In the event that this Act is passed and in the event that the Indian government would not recognize the legal adoption in Canada, it's a possibility that Omprakash would end up with two legal fathers. Have you considered that, or am I misinterpreting this likelihood? And what would then be future complications arising from having two legal fathers in two separate countries?

MR. J. PANJWANI: That's a good question to me. Like, he has gone to school here, and he has education from here. Now he's working here. So it should not present any complications, because by virtue of being here almost 10 years, he's Canadianized. I have looked after him since he was a minor, so it will only help us. I don't know about Indian law. If the natural father consents for his son to be adopted, then there should be no problem here.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Mrs. Gagnon, if this Bill proceeds, it will of course only have impact in the jurisdiction of the province of Alberta. If in fact a conflict of laws issue arises at some time in the future where there is a difference between the laws of India and the laws of Alberta, at that time there would have to be a review of the entire situation to decide which laws would take priority and preference. But at this point in time I don't think it's the kind of issue we need to deal with with respect to this application, merely what the merits are of the application insofar as the province of Alberta is concerned.

I would remind members of the committee that time is running here and we are going through two more applications; however, I am of course happy to receive any other questions.

MRS. GAGNON: I would like to complete. Can I ask the second question?

MR. CHAIRMAN: Oh, pardon me. Yes.

MRS. GAGNON: Jamnu, is your wife in agreement with this? Although I know she won't become the legal mother, she is in agreement with this?

MR. J. PANJWANI: I'm divorced at present, and I have custody of my daughter, a 14 year old. He has been living with me like a son. I have two children and I am a single father.

MS M. LAING: I have a related question. This will have an impact in terms of your daughter's inheritance, and I'm wondering if in fact she is consenting to this application also or has been involved in discussion around it.

MR. J. PANJWANI: Yes, as a matter of fact. She is 14, and they have grown together, so she thinks he is sort of already my son – adopted son, of course. She knows that he didn't come out of her mother's tummy, but otherwise they are like brother and sister. As a matter of fact, when we discussed, she said, "Hey, I want my brother here." Yes.

MRS. B. LAING: I have another question about your original family. What brothers and sisters do you have in India?

MR. O. PANJWANI: I have one sister.

MRS. B. LAING: Just one sister?

MR. O. PANJWANI: Just one sister.

MRS. B. LAING: Your father's willing for you to be adopted?

MR. O. PANJWANI: Ma'am, I don't know why he wants -- the point is that he's my father. I wrote to him a long time ago that I don't want to go to him; I want to live with this gentleman right here. I don't see whatever -- that's just the way of doing things.

MRS. B. LAING: Okay. Thank you.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lund.

MR. LUND: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm curious as to why you haven't taken out Canadian citizenship.

MR. O. PANJWANI: Why I haven't taken Canadian citizenship?

MR. LUND: Why haven't you done it after having been here nine years?

MR. O. PANJWANI: I was brought here when I was 14 years

old. I was in grade 9. Since then I lived with him on a student visa, and that's just how I've been raised here.

MR. J. PANJWANI: If I may answer this question. Like, he went to school with me continuously, it's true. In the school I realized sometimes when I had to sign on his behalf like a father -- a regular thing like if there is an accident or something, you know, as a parent -- I always took it for granted that because he's my brother's son, well, he's my son too. But then at a certain point while I will sign for him, I had the need, so I went for this legal custody in the courts of Alberta. At this time also I thought that's all I need, but now, as we are living as father and son and family, every time I thought that once he's 18, then legal custody doesn't function as it used to. So it came to me that, okay, it will be more simple. Like, I'm saying that he's my son, so I should have the adoption, you see? So then I consulted with someone in Calgary, and they said, "Yeah, you have to follow this procedure, and you get the adoption."

MRS. BLACK: A wrap-up question, Mr. Chairman. What is the term of your work visa? When does it expire?

MR. O. PANJWANI: It expires on June 30, this month.

MRS. BLACK: The end of this week. Are you going for an extension on your work visa?

MR. O. PANJWANI: I have a job, so I'm definitely going to, yes.

MR. DOYLE: Mr. Chairman, if I may, one final question. Have you made application for full status as a Canadian citizen, or do you intend to?

MR. O. PANJWANI: We have made an application as a landed immigrant, yes.

MR. DOYLE: When do you expect your review for Canadian citizenship status to come about?

MR. O. PANJWANI: This Friday, if everything goes right. We have a date with immigration this Friday.

MR. DOYLE: Thank you.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Doyle. Any further questions from the committee?

Anything, Mr. Panjwani, you'd like to say in summary of your application?

MR. J. PANJWANI: No, I guess that's fine.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Well, thank you very much. The committee will consider the application, and we will report to you with our findings. Thank you very much for your time.

Committee members, the next Bill that will be considered is Bill Pr. 3, the Canada Olympic Park Property Tax Exemption Amendment Act, 1989. I'd like to introduce Mr. Tom West, who will be making representations on behalf of the petitioner, and Mr. Jim Miles, who is the legal adviser to the petitioner and will be offering a legal opinion if such is required. MRS. HEWES: Mr. Chairman, can I interfere? Can we have the pot down? This has troubled us in former years. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Perhaps from the point of view of *Hansard*, we could qualify that that is a pot of flowers.

[Mr. West was sworn in]

MR. CHAIRMAN: Mr. West, the tradition of this committee is that we would have opening comments and a presentation from the petitioner. It's not the position of this committee to give a decision today; however, the comments that are received will be reviewed and a decision made as soon as possible, and that decision will be made available to you. So please proceed.

MR. WEST: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think our petition is fairly straightforward and has been submitted to you in a brief statement to the committee earlier. The Olympic Hall of Fame was created to be a legacy of the XV Olympic Winter Games. It is located at Canada Olympic Park. It functions as a sports museum, focusing on the history of the Olympics. It is a complementary program operated by the Calgary Olympic Development Association in co-operation with, or in partnership with, the Canadian Olympic Association. Our petition is to request that the Olympic Hall of Fame be exempt from the payment of property tax much like the other facilities at Canada Olympic Park which do not operate as profit centres for CODA. At the same time, it's worth pointing out to the committee that no other sport museum in the country pays property taxes. The situation has been agreed to and understood by the two municipalities that have been involved in this discussion, and both have agreed with our arguments and have agreed to waive this, subject to the approval of the province.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Do we have copies of letters from both the municipal district of Rocky View and the city of Calgary?

MR. MILES: If I may address that question, Mr. Chairman. We have submitted a copy of the motion passed by the municipality of Rocky View endorsing their consent to the amendment we're seeking. This morning I talked to Mr. Holmes of the city of Calgary, and he confirmed that the Calgary city council has approved the amendment as well, and he will be providing me with the necessary documentation. So I can, with respect to the city of Calgary's position, give an undertaking to provide that documentation as soon as I receive it, which should be in the next few days.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Miles. Committee members' questions? Mr. Brassard.

MR. BRASSARD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Could you tell me, sir, just to what degree there will be revenue generation from this facility?

MR. WEST: As far as the Calgary Olympic Development Association is concerned, the hall of fame will do very well if it can even reach a break-even situation. We anticipate that by and large it will have to be subsidized by CODA and by the Canadian Olympic association. It operates on the basis of a staff of two and a half people and over a hundred volunteers. It received, we anticipate, 75,000 visitors this year. There is an admission charge, but the simple costs of maintaining and upgrading or changing exhibits in the facility are so high that there's just no anticipated positive revenue variance from it. This is quite in line with just about every other museum that I'm aware of in the country. It probably is more successful than most, but it will never be a profit centre. That is for certain.

MR. BRASSARD: Being unfamiliar with the facility itself, you'll have to pardon my question, but is the Olympic Hall of Fame such a facility that it could be rented out and utilized for events in itself?

MR. WEST: It has a certain appeal that way. For example, we have a theatre and small auditorium in it, but there are a number of other facilities already existing at the park that are used this way. To some degree this has been done, but we don't really show revenue from the actual renting out of the facility, say for an evening reception, because our pricing within the overall park is organized such that really the only charge that most people incur is for the actual catering itself, which reflects in revenue back to the catering department, not for rent.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Mrs. Hewes.

MRS. HEWES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. West or Mr. Miles, this is simply adding another chunk to what is already exempt. Gentlemen, what percentage is it of the whole? Are we adding a large amount, or is it a very small, minute amount?

MR. WEST: I think in the overall percentage it's really on the smaller side rather than the large side. The other facilities that I believe are included in the tax exemption are the ski jump complex, the bobsled complex, the athlete training centre. Those are large facilities in and of themselves.

MRS. HEWES: It seemed to me, Mr. Chairman, in terms of square metres that this addition is negligible.

MR. MILES: That would conform with Mr. West's answer. It's negligible in terms of the other facilities that are already exempted.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mrs. Hewes. Mr. Brassard, you had another question?

MR. BRASSARD: A question, Mr. Chairman, I neglected to ask earlier, and I apologize. Why was this building not included in the original request for tax exemption?

MR. WEST: I wasn't on staff at the time of the original exemption. Jim, maybe you could . . .

MR. MILES: I'm not sure of my answer. I'm speculating that the facility had not been completed at that time. We were here in 1986. I'm not sure if the financing for the facility, the benefactors had concluded their arrangements. I qualify my answer somewhat. As I say, I'm speculating, but I believe that may be the reason.

MR. BRASSARD: Then may I ask for another speculation? Do you anticipate any more additions to this conglomerate, if you will?

MR. MILES: Well, at the moment, there's nothing under construction, but I suppose if someone wanted to give us a facility that was of a noncommercial use or nature, we could be back here in the future. That, frankly, would be a happy prospect in our view, but right now there is nothing, to my knowledge.

MR. WEST: As a member of the management team there I would speculate that there wouldn't be. We have enough non-profit centres, if you like, operating there to give CODA enough fits for the time being.

MR. DOYLE: Mr. Chairman, have the taxes been paid since 1986 on this particular facility, or have you paid in any year since it was constructed?

MR. WEST: I have, yes. It's been included in the assessment. This facility was included in the assessment, to my knowledge.

MR. MILES: It was paid last year.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Any further questions by committee members?

Mr. West, if you'd like to sum up, please.

MR. WEST: No. I think we've made our statement already, thank you.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Well, thank you very much for being here today. We'll advise you of the decision of this committee as soon as possible. Thank you.

MR. BRASSARD: While we're waiting for this, Mr. Chairman, could I just offer a suggestion that perhaps we could employ in the future? We used to hastily make a name tag for most of the presenters, and I found it exceptionally helpful when I was addressing individuals with questions. Could we employ that in future meetings?

MR. CHAIRMAN: Yes. I've already chatted with Mr. Clegg about that, and we will be taking care of that for the next meeting. Thank you for your comments.

Committee members, the final Bill that we will be dealing with today is Bill Pr. 9, the Claudia Elizabeth Becker Adoption Act. We have with us today Cheryl Matheson, solicitor for the petitioner, and an associate of her firm, Luba Lisun. I hope that's the correct pronunciation. Both of these ladies are spouses of sitting Members of this Legislative Assembly: Cheryl Matheson the spouse of Ray Martin and Luba Lisun the spouse of John McInnis. This is a rather unique experience, and I understand that Ms Matheson is quite happy to propose a Bill in priority to her husband proposing a Bill in this House.

The other members of the delegation are Claudia Becker, Werner Jensen, the petitioner, and Maria Jensen, the natural mother. So if we could have the petitioners sworn in, Mr. Clegg.

[Ms Matheson, Mr. Jensen, Miss Becker, and Mrs. Jensen were sworn in]

MR. CHAIRMAN: If you would please proceed then, Ms

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Matheson, with your opening remarks and presentation.

MS MATHESON: Thank you very much. Initially I'd like to thank Mr. Gordon Wright, the Member for Edmonton-Strathcona, for sponsoring this Bill to this committee.

Sir, this is a petition for the Claudia Elizabeth Becker Adoption Act. The committee has been provided, I believe, with a statutory declaration sworn by Claudia Becker and attachments thereto. Basically this outlines our position. Claudia Becker is 22 years old. She was born in Poland in 1966, August 4. Her parents were Johann and Maria Bychawska. Her mother, Mrs. Maria Jensen presently, is with her today.

Her parents were divorced May 12, 1970, and from that time until 1974 Claudia had very irregular contact with her father. No maintenance or support was paid to the mother on behalf of Claudia by her father. In 1974 Claudia and her mother emigrated to Canada, and since that time Claudia has had no contact with her father. We have no means of contacting him as there is no knowledge of his whereabouts.

Claudia's mother, Maria, married the petitioner, Werner Jensen, on February 18, 1984. Prior to that time and since their acquaintanceship, Mr. Jensen has treated Claudia as a daughter. She has considered him as a father. She and the petitioner wish to have a legal status which reflects their personal status of father and daughter. We bring this petition to you to make a legal status of a de facto situation.

This would be my submission, sir.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

Mr. Clegg, I believe you have some additional comments that you'd like to make.

MR. M. CLEGG: Mr. Chairman, I would just like to confirm that I have these documents on file and I will distribute copies to the committee prior to our further consideration of this. I should perhaps have distributed these in advance, although they merely confirm what counsel has said in this matter: an affadavit signed by Claudia Becker and also a translation of the birth register showing that Claudia Elizabeth Becker was born in 1966 at Pekanino in Poland, a properly certified translation of that. As I have said, I will provide these documents to the committee for their perusal prior to our further consideration of the Bill.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Clegg. Mr. Hyland.

MR. HYLAND: Mr. Chairman, a couple of questions. Firstly then, if I did my arithmetic right, Claudia would have been over 16 when her mother and the petitioner were married, right? So she couldn't have been adopted other than by this method.

MS MATHESON: Yes, sir. I believe your arithmetic is right. She was born in '66 and they were married in '84. She would have been 18 years old at that time.

MR. HYLAND: So that would have prevented any adoption even at that time without a private Bill?

MS MATHESON: Yes, sir.

MR. HYLAND: Secondly, is Claudia now a Canadian citizen?

MISS BECKER: Yes I am, sir.

MS MATHESON: The answer was yes.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Mr. Brassard.

MR. BRASSARD: Yes. It's just a clarification really, Mr. Chairman. We've established that there has been no authorization received from the natural father to this. Am I right?

MS MATHESON: Yes.

MR. BRASSARD: Mr. Clegg, then could you give me some indication of the legality of proceeding with such action in absence of such authorization? Is there a point when we can't locate the natural father, so we proceed anyway? Could you just clarify that for me?

MR. M. CLEGG: Mr. Chairman, in the case of an adoption under the Child Welfare Act, if the consent of a natural father is not obtained or not obtainable, it is necessary, I believe, to obtain a court order to enable the adoption to take place in the absence of that consent. There is no doubt that this Legislature has full legal power to grant the adoption without the consent or even against the opposition of a natural father, because the powers of this Assembly are not limited in that regard in any way.

In this particular case, where there has been no contact with the natural father since emigration in 1974, which is 15 years ago, it would seem to me that this is the kind of situation where the courts would dispense with consent because where a fatherhas not kept in contact with his daughter for a period of 15 years, even by correspondence, the court would tend to view his interest in the matter as having evaporated. As far as the literal answer to the direct question, there is no impediment to this Assembly's ability to grant an adoption without a consent. We can do that.

MR. BRASSARD: Then one further question. I guess I'm confused. This young lady will end up with two fathers. I guess my concern is that if the natural father should return tomorrow and demand parental rights, I guess there would be some conflict. I guess it brings me back to the question of just why the petitioner would like this to take place when she is already enjoying the relationship of the natural mother.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Perhaps I will make a brief comment and then ask Mr. Clegg if he has any additional comments. One of the most important reasons for adult adoptions is to allow relationships such as are before us today to be recognized by authorities, particularly in the event of illness, catastrophe, accident, and these types of things, in terms of making information available. [interjection] Pardon me?

MR. BRASSARD: I guess I was asking the petitioner why she wanted it.

MS MATHESON: Mr. Chairman, if I can just make a clarification here. I believe the question is to Miss Becker, not the petitioner. Mr. Werner Jensen is the petitioner in this matter.

MISS BECKER: Well, sir, I have not had any contact with my natural father for 15 years or so. I do not, with any discredit to

my natural father, consider him as a father figure. Since my mother has remarried Werner Jensen, he has been with us for, I believe, seven or eight years now, and from that time he has been as a father would be to me. It would be more an emotional tie, I would say, if it was made legal. I'm not quite sure if I'm expressing myself correctly, but for the past years he has been as a father would be to me, and it would be made so once this Act has been passed, if it shall be. I'm not quite sure if I'm answering.

MR. BRASSARD: Thank you very much.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Mr. Wright was first.

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to point out that a father has no rights over a child of full age and mental and physical competence, anyway, to inveigh.

MR. CHAIRMAN: That's a good point. Mrs. Black.

MRS. BLACK: My question is to Mr. Jensen. Do you have other children, sir?

MR. JENSEN: No. I don't have any children at all. For the years that I have now been married to Maria and for the years before we were married, we had known each other, I had always been very fond of Claudia. It would please me very much if she could now be made my legal daughter. I do consider her my daughter at the present time, but I would like to see that it would be legal, in accordance to law.

Thank you.

MRS. BLACK: And to Mrs. Jensen. Are there any other children? Do you have any other children?

MRS. JENSEN: No, I don't.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Any other questions from the committee? Mr. Clegg, you have a comment.

MR. M. CLEGG: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to add a comment to mavbe clarify a point that Mr. Brassard raised, and that is the possibility of one country recognizing one person as a legal father and the other country recognizing another. In international private law there sometimes do arise circumstances where one country will have one view of a circumstance in law and another country will have another view. However, there's a general convention respected by most nations which governs this type of situation, and approximately that convention is this: that where a family matter, or a contractual matter for that matter, is determined in the country where a person is domiciled -- that is to say, where they have made a permanent decision to make a permanent home -- then that decision and the jurisdiction of a court, which we would be regarded as, is respected by the other country.

To put that in the present circumstances, it is my understanding of private international law that the Polish courts, in determining the proper fathership of Claudia Becker, would say, "We will respect the decision of a court or a Legislature that was made in the country where she was domiciled and at a time where she was domiciled." If, under Canadian law and Alberta law, where she is counted domiciled, she is now regarded as being the daughter of Werner Jensen, then the Polish court would accept that fact. That's my understanding. That's the manner in which private international law conflicts are normally resolved, although it is theoretically possible that the Polish court might have a different view of the matter.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Clegg. Mr. Severtson.

MR. SEVERTSON: One further question I would like to ask. Are Mr. and Mrs. Jensen both Canadian citizens?

MRS. JENSEN: Yes.

MS MATHESON: Werner, are you a Canadian citizen?

MR. JENSEN: Yes, I am.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Any additional questions, committee members?

Any matters in summary, Ms Matheson?

MS MATHESON: I would like to thank the committee for their time and attention this morning.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. Again, as I've mentioned to the other petitioners, it's not the position of this committee to make its position known today. We will review this matter, and we will report that decision to you in due course. Thank you very much for being here.

Committee members, are there any additional matters that anyone would like to bring up this morning? Next week, of course, it is adjournment. The week following we would normally sit on the 12th; however, Public Accounts is having, I think, a conference here, and they will be using the Chamber. So it had been deemed expedient to have our next meeting on the following Wednesday, the 19th. That should still give us more than ample time to review all of the Bills by the first week of August, and that again will give us ample time to have our committee reports and a review and come down with our findings.

MR. M. CLEGG: Mr. Chairman, I've had some difficulty in arranging agenda until a couple of days ago. That's the only reason I have not yet communicated to the committee in writing the new proposed agenda for consideration of the Bills. We weren't able to quite organize these in the order in which the committee had originally suggested, but we will be getting to the committee members within a day or two with the suggested agenda.

I'd like to, if I may, Mr. Chairman, just read out the Bills which we would hope to deal with on the 19th. The first one would be the Edmonton General Grey Nuns Bill, which is the one which will have completed its advertising by July 15, the very simple one where they're changing their name by adding the word "the." The second one would be Pr. 7, the Calgary Foundation Amendment Act, which carries out some administrative changes to the Calgary Foundation. The third would be the Calgary Research and Development Authority Act, Bill Pr. 6, which is a complete re-enactment of their Act to incorporate a number of amendments that have been passed in the last couple of years, plus some further ones they're asking for. The fourth one on that day would be Tammy Lynn Proctor Adoption Act, another adoption of a stepdaughter. That's the suggested agenda for July 19.

As I say, on the subsequent dates, on the 26th I would propose that we deal with the Misericordia Bill, the Kenford adoption, and the Jerry Dan Kovacs Legal Articles Bill, leaving August 2 for the Edmonton Community Foundation and the Sherry Lynn Adam Adoption Bill.

That will then leave us with probably a further two Wednesdays or maybe one Wednesday when we can complete our consideration in camera. What has been done in the past is that on subsequent meetings after the first, we have, perhaps when the committee members were ready, dealt in camera with Bills that were heard the previous week. If members are ready to deal with any of the Bills which we have heard today in camera on the 19th and if we have time, the committee could make a decision as to what to do about that on that occasion. But I will get this proposed agenda out to members today or tomorrow.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Clegg. Any questions arising? Mr. Brassard. MR. BRASSARD: The last adoption one that you mentioned that we're going to be hearing on the 19th: what was the name? Was it Lynn Proctor?

MR. M. CLEGG: The last one I mentioned was the one on August 2, which is Sherry Lynn Adam.

MR. BRASSARD: No, the one for our next meeting.

MR. M. CLEGG: The one on July 19 is Tammy Lynn Proctor.

MR. BRASSARD: Thank you very much.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Any other questions? Could we have a motion, then, to adjourn? Mr. Brassard. All in favour?

HON. MEMBERS: Agreed.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Opposed? Carried. Thank you very much.

[The committee adjourned at 11:33 a.m.]